Indeterminacy debate in legal theory
Jurist, Critical legal studies, Ronald Dworkin, Rule of law, Conservatism, Liberalism
978-613-5-68533-6
6135685333
76
2011-07-23
34.00 €
eng
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Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. The indeterminacy debate in legal theory can be summed up as follows: Can the law constrain the results reached by adjudicators in legal disputes? Some members of the critical legal studies movement — primarily legal academics in the United States — argued that the answer to this question is "no." Another way to state this position is to suggest that disputes cannot be resolved with clear answers and thus there is at least some amount of uncertainty in legal reasoning and its application to disputes. A given body of legal doctrine is said to be "indeterminate" by demonstrating that every legal rule in that body of legal doctrine is opposed by a counterrule that can be used in a process of legal reasoning. The indeterminacy thesis emerged as a far-left reply to Ronald Dworkin's "right answer" thesis. In its strongest form it is an extreme version of legal realism. It argues that nothing is law until it has been promulgated by an official - either a judge or the legislature. For example, a statute that says "No person may smoke in a hospital" does not mean that "John Doe may not smoke in a hospital"; the second statement is the law only if a legitimate authority declares so.
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